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DEFRAUDING THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF REENGINEERED AUDIT PROCESSES’
DECREASED LIKELIHOOD OF DETECTING FRAUD
In the past few years, most of the major international public accounting firms have
reengineered their audit processes to improve the cost effectiveness of completing an audit and to
focus on value-added services for clients. The reengineered audit processes generally focus on a
client’s business processes and the information systems used by the client to generate financial
information. In essence, the new audit approaches deemphasize direct testing of the underlying
transactions and account balances. Such an approach emphasizes analytical procedures as the main
source of substantive evidence. During this same time period, however, the profession (through
the AICPA) explicitly acknowledged the profession’s responsibility for fraud detection.
The main premise of this paper is that the increased emphasis on systems assessments is at
odds with the profession’s position regarding fraud detection because most material frauds
originate at the top levels of the organization, where controls and systems are least prevalent and
effective. As such, the profession may be paying lip service to fraud detection, while at the same
time changing the audit process in a manner that is less effective at detecting the most common
frauds.
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DEFRAUDING THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF REENGINEERED AUDIT PROCESSES’ AND
FRAUD DETECTION
“We cannot permit thorough audits to be sacrificed for reengineered approaches that are
efficient, but less effective.” Arthur Levitt, Former Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission.
In the last few years, most of the major international public accounting firms have
reengineered their audit processes to improve the cost effectiveness of an audit and to focus on
value-added services for clients. These reengineered audit processes generally focus on a client’s
business processes and an evaluation of the information systems used by the client to generate
financial information. In fact, an audit manager at one major firm’s office in Hartford (USA)
recently noted that for the bulk of the office’s major clients (over half of the current audit work for
that office), an audit constituted a review of the client’s information systems and associated
internal controls over those systems. The audit manager noted that they would also complete “a
handful of accounts receivable confirmations and some inventory observation so that the partner
wouldn’t stroke out.” (It should be noted that these latter two tests are mandatory under current
U.S. audit standards). In essence, other than cursory completion of these obligatory tests, the new
audit approach ignored any direct substantive testing of the underlying transactions and account
balances.1
An audit approach emphasizing controls is similar in philosophy to other firm’s
reengineered audit approaches whereby the only substantive testing completed in many cases are
analytical procedures—procedures that were not even considered substantive audit tests prior to
the “great discovery” with the 1988 expectation gap audit standards intended to alleviate the
public outcry over the failure of audits to detect fraudulent financial reporting and to identify
companies that are questionable going concerns. Additionally, the profession’s recent move to
“continuous auditing” would place almost exclusive reliance on control assessments (CICA,
1999).
At the same time, the profession has formalized its fraud detection authority with the
promulgation of SAS # 82, which requires the auditor to provide “reasonable assurance” of
detecting material fraud. However, the recent KPMG 1998 Fraud Survey indicates that fraud
discovery by external auditor review amounted to only 4% of discovered frauds—down from 5%
1

Similar statements regarding emphasis on controls can be found in Winograd, et al. (2000) regarding
PricewaterhouseCoopers and in KPMG (1997).
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in 1994. On the other hand, the average loss from false financial statements increased from
$765,000 in the 1994 survey to $1,239,000 in the 1998 survey. It is not surprising that the public is
often found asking the question, “Where were the auditors?”
At the heart of the emerging perspectives that seem to dominate contemporary
accountancy firm beliefs, as evidenced by the reengineered audit approaches, is that fraud is
something lower level employees are responsible for. The nature of internal control systems is that
the lower level employees can be controlled through relatively low cost control implementations,
while it is neither feasible nor perhaps possible to build effective control systems for upper
management. Hence, a shift toward greater reliance on a systems auditing approach involves an
implicit adoption of the belief that if lower level employees are controlled, the prevalence of fraud
will decrease.
A detailed review of the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAERs—which are predominantly related to instances of fraud) demonstrates that the
preponderance of financial statement frauds are perpetrated by the very top levels of
management—generally the CEO or equivalent level. This finding is the antithesis of the inherent
assumption that has been adopted by the accountancy profession via the implementation of
reengineered audit processes focused on internal control monitoring.
The main premise of this paper is that the increased emphasis on systems assessments is at
odds with the profession’s position regarding fraud detection because most material frauds
originate at the top levels of the organization, where controls and systems are least prevalent and
effective. In the remainder of this paper, we expand upon the basic propositions that we have put
forth. This presentation is divided into five additional sections. The next section presents the
results of studies examining the source of financial statement frauds. This analysis is followed by a
presentation of the profession’s stated responsibilities for fraud detection, and the profession’s
perspective on the source of financial statement frauds. The following section presents a critical
examination of the reengineering, continuous auditing, and analytical procedure initiatives of the
public accounting profession and the potential effects of these initiatives on fraud detection. The
final section provides some concluding comments and concerns over the likely increase in the
expectations gap between auditors and users of financial statement audits.
SOURCE OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUDS
The source of financial statement fraud can be an important consideration in the way an
auditor might detect a material misstatement. Specifically, fraud created by higher level
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management may be more difficult for the auditor to detect due to the lack of control system
oversight of top management. In this section, we review the existing literature on the source of
financial statement misstatements, and provide additional empirical evidence on the source of
frauds for more recent time periods.
Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson (1999) studied frauds committed by 204 companies
based on SEC fraud findings issued between 1987 and 1997.2 The objectives of their study were to
provide base measurements of the prevalence of fraud, and nature of the companies and the
individuals within companies who were involved in fraudulent financial reporting. Their findings
indicate that the CEO was involved in 72% of the frauds they examined.
This section presents a review of individuals responsible for recent financial statement
frauds based on a study of accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) issued by the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1998 and 1999. The main focus of this section is to
ascertain who was involved in committing the financial statement frauds. An AAER is only issued
if the fraud was presented in published financial statements, indicating that the frauds reported
were not detected by an auditor.3
The sample of AAERs used in this study begins in January, 1998, immediately after the
sample used by Beasley, et al. (1999) ends. The AAERs examined range from number 1004 to
number 1213, spanning a period from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1999. Of these 210
AAERs, 139 involve accounting or auditing issues unrelated to a financial statement fraud,4 or
cover a financial statement fraud discussed in other AAERs.5 As such, our analysis is based on 72
2

When the SEC discovers materially misstated financial statements, an accounting and auditing enforcement release
(AAER) describing the fraud is issued. The SEC also documents the actions they have taken against the perpetrators of
the fraud. Typical sanctions by the SEC include a censure and fine. The SEC may also refer the perpetrators to the US
Attorney for potential criminal prosecution.
3

Loebbecke et al. (1989) gathered information on frauds which were detected by auditors. Of the
non-theft frauds discovered by the auditors in their sample, 64.8% involved the client’s CEO.
4
For example, AAER # 1074 relates to an allegation of lack of auditor independence.
5
For example in the Livent case of early 1999, at least 5 AAERs were issued for the same fraud.
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cases of financial statement misstatement which resulted in the issuance of at least 1 AAER.6
What is most noteworthy regarding the updated AAER information is that the number of
frauds discovered appears to be growing. Beasley, et al. (1999) examined AAERs for a 10 year
period (1987 to 1997), and found 204 unique instances of fraud, for an average of 20.4 frauds per
year over the ten year period. In the current study, we examined two years of AAERs (1998 &
1999), and identified 72 unique instances of fraud, or 36.5 per year, on average. This finding
suggests that the prevalence of fraud may be increasing
The position of the individual who was found responsible for the each of the financial
statement frauds is summarized in Table 1. The table indicates that the most of the material frauds
undetected by auditors arise from top management’s actions. Over 70% of the frauds examined
directly involved the top executive of the organization. For example, AAER # 1206 documents the
fraudulent financial reporting perpetrated by The Cronos Group. In this case, the SEC noted that
“Palatin [CEO and Board Chairman] controlled the company’s disclosures and was the beneficiary
of the transactions which the company misrepresented in its filings. Cronos systematically fired or
demoted employees and directors who challenged or questioned that transactions or disclosures”
(AAER # 1206, p. 2). An additional 14 of the 72 frauds (i.e., 19.4%) were the result of actions by a
senior manager who was not the CEO. As such, over 90% of the frauds which the auditor failed to
detect were perpetrated by senior management. Less than 10% of the frauds identified in the
AAERs were the result of actions by individuals below the level of senior management. In these
cases, divisional management was typically the perpetrator of the fraud.
[Please place Table 1 about here]
THE AUDITOR’S FRAUD DETECTION RESPONSIBILITY
In the US, the accounting profession promulgated SAS # 82, which applies to audits after
Each of the AAERs involved the actions of different participants in the fraud. In cases where multiple
AAERs were issued for a single fraud, the fraud was included only once in our analysis.
6
Our ratio of frauds to AAERs of 37.8% (95 frauds/251 AAERs) is similar to that of Bonner et al.
(1998), who found 261 frauds in 674 AAERs examined (i.e., 38.7%).
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1997. SAS # 82 makes explicit that the auditor “plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statement are free of material misstatement, whether caused
by error or fraud.” (AU 316.02, emphasis added). The use of the word fraud was a material change
in the standards, the previous terminology being “irregularity.” The key question for auditor’s
fraud detection responsibility is then what level of responsibility “reasonable assurance” implies.
The term is defined in the standards by what it does not represent (AU 316.10, emphasis added):
An auditor cannot obtain absolute assurance that material misstatements in the
financial statement will be detected. Because of (a) the concealment aspects of
fraudulent activity, including the fact that fraud often involves collusion or falsified
documentation, and (b) the need to apply professional judgment in the
identification and evaluation of fraud risk factors and other conditions, even a
properly planned and performed audit may not detect a material misstatement
arising from fraud. Accordingly, ... the auditor is only able to obtain reasonable
assurance that material misstatements in the financial statements, including
misstatements resulting from fraud, are detected.
In effect, reasonable assurance is something less than 100% assurance of fraud detection.
Because the process needed to detect fraud varies depending on the source of the fraud, the
operationalization of reasonable assurance will affect the probability of detecting frauds involving
senior management. In general, the manner in which the accounting profession has operationalized
reasonable assurance suggests that top management fraud is not a significant concern of the
profession.
While the U.S. profession acknowledged its professional fraud detection responsibility in
SAS # 82 in the late 1990s, the profession’s legal responsibility to detect fraud diminished in the
late 1990s due to legislative action. The auditor’s potential for legal loss resulting from failure to
detect fraud was significantly limited by a 1995 securities law change. In this change, Schmitt
(1998) notes the US congress “adopted a fairly narrow view of auditor’s duties” (A6) regarding
fraud detection which made auditors “‘huge winners’” (A6) by reducing their exposure to lawsuits
for failure to detect fraud. As such, the potential legal incentives for auditors to detect fraud
decreased in the late 1990s.
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THE PROFESSION’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOURCE OF FRAUD
SAS # 82 provided guidance on risk factors that may suggest the presence of both top
management and lower level fraud. However, the emphasis indicated by various CPA firms and
professional publications has been on lower level fraud. Sriram and Vollmers (1997) note that as
early as 1933, the profession was focused on lower level employee fraud: “To avoid fraud,
management was responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate system of internal
control” (p. 76, emphasis added). Recent examples of the profession’s focus on lower level fraud
are also common. For example, an article published in the Journal of Accountancy providing
guidance on fraud detection provided an example of a lower level fraud created by a branch
manager (Barnett at al. 1998). More recently, the same journal published Beek et al. (1999), which
focused on how the auditor could work as a “sleuth” to help senior management catch lower level
employee fraud. KPMG adopted a similar approach in their 1998 fraud report, which focused on
frauds perpetrated by lower level employees. There is even a section of the report entitled “How to
deter employee fraud.” There is no similar section on how to deter top management fraud. The
professional standards in the US indicate that (AU 316.02) : “...management is responsible for the
prevention and detection of fraud” [emphasis added], once again indicating that the profession’s
perspective is that fraud is perpetrated by lower-level employees overseen by management, rather
than by management themselves. In effect, the profession’s operationalization of reasonable
assurance of fraud detection seems to exclude responsibility for detecting senior management
fraud.
This focus by the profession on lower level fraud reveals the accounting profession’s
cultural affinity with the members of upper management. The profession’s perception of lower
level employees as the source of potential problems is made clear in a recent monograph on the
changing audit process, in which it is indicated that to avoid distributing misleading financial
statements “Organizations, therefore, will continue to invest significant resources (in control
structures) to guard against such risk” (KPMG 1997). If one is thinking only of lower level
employee fraud, this position is reasonable. However, one must recognize that “organizations” do
6

not think separately and distinctly from senior management.7 This statement would therefore
imply that senior managers spend considerable resources ensuring that they themselves are
adequately controlled. There is little evidence to support such a conclusion.8
The profession’s cultural affinity with senior management can be seen in the Cendant fraud
which was discovered in 1998. In this case, senior management overstated annual revenues by
more than $300 million to create an appearance of constant growth. An individual involved in the
Cendant audit (which failed to detect the misstatement) was quoted as saying, “We never thought
[senior management of Cendant] were the type that would do [that] sort of thing” (MacDonald
1998). So much for professional skepticism!
REENGINEERING THE EXPECTATIONS GAP
This section of the paper will focus on three major initiatives of the auditing profession
which have recently taken place or are proposed to take place soon. These initiatives will be
reviewed in light of their ability to deal with the type of fraud which has been found to be most
prevalent (i.e., fraud involving top management). The first two topics to be addressed in this
section are the reengineering of the audit and the move to “continuous auditing,” both of which
place greater emphasis on internal control systems. Second, the increased use of analytical review
in reengineered audits is discussed.
The Audit as Control System Assurance
One of the key changes in audit processes being proposed by advocates of both
reengineered audit processes and of continuous auditing is enhanced reliance on control systems.
Such an emphasis, however, ignores the limitations of internal control systems. The design and
implementation of internal control systems have always carried the caveat that the benefit of
additional internal control procedures should justify the costs. However, the typical cost curve for
internal control system implementation is an exponential function (see Figure 1). The nature of this
cost-benefit function is that with a small investment, significant gains in systems reliability are
7

The professional standards recognize this in their discussion of the tone at the top as an important
component of an entity’s control structure.
8
For example, the Financial Executives Institute issued a statement indicating their opposition to
proposals put forward by the Blue Ribbon Panel on the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. These
proposals were designed to strengthen corporate governance and oversight of top management by the Audit
Committee (Petersen, 1999).
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made initially. This initial rapid gain is generally recognized to evolve from the implementation of
low cost procedures such as segregation of functions which divides the responsibilities of
employees and essentially eliminates the risk of fraud without the occurrence of collusion. Hence,
the lower level employees are easily controlled at a relatively low cost.
[Please Insert Figure 1 about here]
The exponential nature of the curve, however, recognizes that after a certain point it
becomes very difficult to improve systems reliability without incurring significant additional
costs. The primary driver of this change in cost curve is the shifting from controlling employees
whose functions are easily segregated to a focus on higher level managers whose functions are less
easily segregated without sacrificing certain organizational efficiencies. At this point, most
organizations choose not to incur the large incremental costs that would be necessary to enforce
control. While cost is one factor for this decision, the other driving factor is the perspective that
such accomplished individuals as senior management are more committed and more
trustworthy—hence, not of concern in the organizational control system.
In addition, in any control system, there is always the possibility of management override
of the system (SAS # 78, ¶ 16). An override involves a manager going outside the system to
accomplish some objective. While the objective may be appropriate, senior managers can also
work around the system to perpetrate fraud in a way that even the most carefully designed system
will be unable to detect.9 Due to the inherent limitations of control, a fraud perpetrated by a CEO
will not be detected by the client’s internal control system.
The potential barriers which might prevent a fraud from reaching a company’s financial
statements are presented in Figure 2. As the figure indicates, there are many barriers to a lower
level fraud reaching the financial statements. A well designed internal control system may serve to
prevent or detect lower level fraud. Similarly, top management has the oversight responsibility and
authority to detect lower level employee fraud. Finally, if the fraud has eluded both the control
system and top management, the auditor may uncover the lower level fraud if it is material. For
fraud created by top management, however, the internal control system will be ineffective in
detection due to both the cost/benefit and management override discussed above. Also, top
management will not be looking for fraud created by themselves. As such, the detection of top
9

For example, at the 2000 Continuous Auditing and Reporting Symposium, one of the participants
presented software that was designed to perform continuous auditing on the client’s system. When the
presenter was queried about who controlled the software on the client’s system, the presenter noted that the
client could turn the software off since it was running on the client’s system. In such a case, management
could easily conceal a fraud they created by turning off the auditor’s software at the appropriate times.
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management fraud is left solely to the audit committee10 and the auditor. Thus, auditors have a
particularly important role in detecting top management fraud because the auditor is virtually the
only mechanism in place to detect top management (especially CEO) fraud.
[Please place Figure 2 about here]
The move to reengineered audit procedures focusing on internal control systems
exacerbates the difficulty of fraud detection, as the auditor succumbs to management’s
perspectives of trustworthiness. By focusing on the internal control system, the auditor adopts the
stereotype that lower level employees are the only potential source of error and/or fraud.
This point becomes even clearer through examination of the fraud dichotomy put forth by
the AICPA in SAS 82 (AICPA 1997). SAS 82 notes that two types of misstatements are relevant to
the auditor’s consideration of financial statement fraud: (1) misstatements arising from
misappropriations of assets, and (2) misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting.
Misstatements arising from misappropriations of assets involve the theft of client assets where the
effect of the theft causes the financial statements to be misstated. Sources of such fraud include
activities such as embezzling receipts, stealing assets, or causing an entity to pay for goods or
services not received (SAS # 82). Sources of such frauds generally can occur throughout the
organization, and these are the types of fraud most likely to be reduced via a strong internal control
system.11
Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are intentional misstatements in
financial statements with the intent to deceive financial statement users. Sources of such
misstatements include manipulation or falsification of accounting records, misrepresentations or
intentional omissions from the financial statements, and/or intentional misapplications of
10

Beasley (1996) and Beasley et al. (2000) suggest that fraudulent financial reporting may be less prevalent in firms
with strong audit committees. These findings could result from audit committees “catching” top management fraud.
Alternatively, the top management of companies who are unlikely to engage in fraud may be more willing to structure
their boards with stronger audit committees. Given the polar opposite alternatives for interpretation, it is unclear
whether audit committees are actually effective at fraud detection.
11
For theses types of controls, Waggoner (1990) notes that the average auditor in his study found only 59% of the
instances in which the control system was not followed. This finding further suggests that an increased reliance on
the auditor’s control assessment as part of a reengineered audit may affect the probability of finding even
non-management fraud, due to the auditor overrelying on the control system to find lower level employee fraud.
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accounting principles. Such fraudulent activities seem beyond the scope (or motivation) of lower
level employees. Rather, it would seem to be within the domain of top level management and
beyond the domain of the internal control system.
Analytical Procedures as Conclusive Audit “Evidence”
The key event that opened the floodgates of audit process reengineering appears to be the
“great discovery” of 1988. As the AICPA issued the nine expectations gap audit standards among
a great publicity push on how the profession was evolving to meet the expectations of users and the
public interest, one broadly acclaimed change in the classification of analytical procedures
actually triggered an apparent undermining of the public interest. The “great discovery” was the
sudden realization that analytical procedures were capable of not only aiding in the planning of an
audit, but also were now a valid substantive testing procedure. With the advent of analytical
procedures as a valid substantive testing procedure, auditors could now fulfill their audit
responsibilities through a combination of testing the internal control system and performing
analytical procedures - while performing only very limited substantive testing.
The SEC has expressed concerns about this approach in a letter from the Chief Accountant
of the SEC to the AICPA (Turner 1998, p. 10):
The recent combination of changes in the audit process and high profile financial frauds have
raised questions about the efficacy of the audit process. For example, auditors have changed their
audit procedures to use a risk assessment model that places increased reliance on analytical
procedures, while decreasing the use of substantive audit procedures such as confirmations with
debtors and detailed testing of transactions, account balances, and the activity in those accounts.
This restructuring of the audit process has come at a time when the press has reported several
frauds involving materially and in some cases hugely misstated financial statements that appear to
have gone undetected by auditors.
This concern is supported by the results of Loebbecke et al.’s (1989) study. In a survey of 121
KPMG (then Peat Marwick) partners, 287 frauds had been detected by the audit partners in past
engagements. Of the 287 discoveries, 61% were discovered via substantive tests of balances while
only 19% were discovered through analytical tests of specific accounts. Yet, a recent monograph
on reengineered auditing states: “KPI (key performance indicators (i.e., analytical tests)) ... can be
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used as substantives tests to obtain evidential matter about particular assertions at the account
balance or class of transactions level” (KPMG, 1997, p. 54).
The greatest difficulty in the effective application of analytical review procedures is in the
interpretation of findings. The key idea is that the auditor should have formed an expectation about
what the account balance/ratio, etc. should be. Without such a clear statement of expectations, the
effectiveness of analytical review as an audit technique will be limited. The US auditing standards
note that (AU 329.11) “The expected effectiveness...of an analytical procedure ...depends on ... the
reliability of the data used to develop the expectation ... [and] the precision of the expectation.”
The SEC indicates that in some instances, auditors have applied analytical review based on a
default expectation that a balance which did not change was not an area of concern, without
considering whether the balance should have changed (Turner, 1998):
It has been noted in some instances that analytics have been the only auditing procedure applied to
significant liability accounts established for losses such as restructuring. For example, the staff has
noted where balances were compared from one year to another, and as long as the balances did not
change, the auditor noted no further work was considered necessary. Often such an audit
procedure is inadequate in light of ongoing changes to the company’s business plans, strategies
and industry conditions. Auditors need to understand what activity has occurred within the account
balances, and in instances where no activity has occurred, question whether this is appropriate.
Much of the educational, academic and professional literature on analytical review,
however, focuses on fluctuations in account balances being the main indicators of potential
misstatements (e.g., Konrath, 1999; Anderson and Koonce 1998). The recent AICPA monograph
on the use of analytical procedures (AICPA 1999) indicates the importance of developing
expectations during the analytical review process: “In all cases, the effectiveness of analytical
review procedures lies in developing expectations that can reasonably be expected to identify
unexpected relationships” (p. 2). Yet a few pages later, the monograph indicates that when using
two of the four analytical procedures discussed, the auditor would rely on “implicit expectations”
(p. 8) when using these techniques.
A particular instance in which the faulty application of analytical procedures lead to the
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auditor failing to adequately deal with a material misstatement is discussed in Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) # 1015 & # 1037 relating to the Perry Drug Company.
In this case, Perry had overstated inventory by $20 million, which resulted in an actual loss for the
period being reported as a profit. Arthur Andersen was aware of the $20 million discrepancy
between the physical inventory and the recorded inventory, but agreed with the client’s use of the
overstated recorded inventory balance because analytical testing revealed no significant change
from recent periods, even though Perry had changed the method used to compute inventory cost.
In other cases, the auditor is much more likely to be unaware of such discrepancies.
However, the use of analytical procedures is almost always focused on the analysis of differences
from the previous years—and not similarities as was the case with Perry Drug. At the root of this
problem, similar to the focus on internal controls, is an inherent assumption that problems arise
from the lower level employees whose fraudulent activities would result in changes to account
balances. However, auditors rarely stop to consider that an upper level manager who falls to the
temptations of fraud is most likely to attempt to cover up such a fraud by making the accounts look
normal. Senior management is also more likely to have the broader authority necessary to
manipulate different aspects of the financial statements to make them appear more “normal.” In
other words, the senior manager is in a position to manipulate the financial statements to make
them look similar to past years so that the auditors’ analytical procedures present evidence
supporting the contention that everything is fine since no discrepancies with prior year financial
statements are detected.
The Cendant fraud: An example of why control assessment and analytical review are not
sufficient
In a financial statement audit, there are three main ways in which fraudulent misstatements
may be detected: (1) through the client’s control system (2) through the auditor’s effective use of
analytical review and (3) through substantive testing of transactions and balances. The Cendant
case was a widely publicized fraud in which the auditors failed to detect a material misstatement.
The SEC subsequently issued an AAER (# 1272) documenting their findings. In the Cendant case,
there were a large number of personnel involved, from top managers to divisional controllers. As
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such, both collusion and top management override were present, indicating that a thorough audit
review of the internal control system would not have detected the fraud because the fraud occurred
outside the control system. In addition, the SEC documents that management was careful to ensure
that there were no significant changes in financial statement ratios so that the auditor’s suspicions
would not be raised by analytical review. As such, analytical review would not likely be effective
to detect a Cendant type fraud.
A wide variety of techniques were used by Cendant management to misstatement the
financial statements, two of which are as follows. First the company failed to record decreases in
cash that were the result of revenue transactions being canceled. By December 31, 1997, there was
a $100 million discrepancy between the cash on Cendant’s books and the cash in Cendant’s bank
(AAER 1272, footnote 13).12 An auditor could have detected such a misstatement most readily
through substantive testing via a comparison of the book and bank records, use of bank
confirmations, and/or through a thorough examination of Cendant’s bank reconciliation. A second
means of misstating the financial statements was for management to enter incorrect subsidiary
financial information onto consolidation spreadsheets without explanation, and while maintaining
the correct balances on the subsidiary’s ledger accounts. As with the cash misstatement identified
above, the prudent application of the substantive testing process of verifying that two client
documents agreed could have lead to the discovery of the fraud. There were a number of other
techniques used by Cendant, most of which would not have been detected using control
assessment or analytical review, but which could have been discovered by an auditor carefully
using basic substantive testing techniques and a healthy dose of professional skepticism. As such,
increased reliance on control assessment and analytical review opens the possibility of more frauds
being undetected by independent auditors, because of their focus on lower level employees, rather
then top managers, as the source of material fraud.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Among the recommendations of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting (Treadway Commission—1987) was that generally accepted auditing standards should
be changed to reflect the independent auditor’s responsibility for the detection of fraudulent
financial reporting. Under pressure from the business press, congressional hearings, and intense
litigation; the accountancy profession responded to the Treadway Report with the issuance of the
so-called “Expectation Gap Standards.” These nine standards included addressing the auditor’s
12

This discrepancy represented approximately 2/3 of Cendant’s reported cash of $149.5 million at December 31,
1997.
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responsibility for detecting fraud and illegal acts (SAS Nos 53 and 54), improving the
effectiveness of audits (SAS Nos. 55, 56, and 57), and the improvement of communications (SAS
Nos. 58, 59, 60, and 61). Ironically, these are the very standards that have helped enable the
development of the newly reengineered audit processes and the virtual abandonment of any
responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting.
This is not inconsistent with the concerns voiced by Byington and Sutton (1991) who
viewed the expectation gap standards as an attempt to signal greater change to the profession’s
critics than in fact the profession intended to make. The Byington and Sutton (1991) study used a
professional monopoly lens in viewing the historical pattern of standards releases by the
profession and found that in times of deep criticism the profession showed a definite pattern of
increased standards issuance in an apparent attempt to signal change. In each case, when the
criticism abated the profession slowed the number of standards releases. The resulting impact of
the “Expectations Gap Standards” a decade later appears to be a regressing in assumed
professional responsibility rather than an attempt to bridge the gap and move towards meeting the
expectations of financial statement users.
The “Expectation Gap Standards” included the “great discovery” where the profession
suddenly realized that analytical procedures were not only acceptable and necessary for planning
an audit, but that these same procedures could also replace substantive testing of account balances
and underlying transactions. In a less obvious vein, this change also enhanced the feasibility of
moving to a heavy internal control evaluation focus. It has long been the position of the
accountancy profession that both internal control evaluation and substantive testing were
necessary and required in an effective audit. However, increased internal control testing provides
for less substantive testing if in fact the internal control system proves reliable during testing. This
provides the justification for a process that is focused on internal control system evaluation and
then uses analytical procedures as sufficient for meeting the reduced need for substantive testing
procedures. Add to this the de facto decrease in responsibility for fraud assumed by the profession
after the release of the “Expectations Gap Standards”, and the natural evolution is today’s
reengineered audit process. In effect, there has been a decoupling of the activity of auditing
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practice from the professional claim of audit effectiveness in accord with the Meyer and Rowan
(1977) theory of institutionalized organizations.
As Shaked and Sutton (1981) note, the potential problem that exists with a professional
monopoly (such as the accountancy profession) is the lack of incentives to provide a service at a
level of quality that exceeds the minimum level that the market will accept. Hence, as Levitt
(1998) suggests, the profession appears to be looking at methods for improving the efficiency of
the audit process through reengineered audit processes without necessarily any concern for the
enhancement, or even maintenance, of audit effectiveness.
While such an approach may succeed without any successful resistance given the positive
economic environment, and a favorable political environment; the long run viability of such a
strategy can be devastating to a profession. Martens and McEnroe (1992) note that by granting
CPAs (and CAs) a professional monopoly whereby the profession can set its own rules; CPAs (and
CAs) have been placed in a special position of public trust. The premium accounting professionals
receive is a reward for trustworthy performance in their adjudicatory function. Habermas (1971)
notes that adjudication processes retain their authority only as long as they command legitimacy
with disputants. If accounting professionals lose the public’s trust regarding their responsibilities
for fraud detection, then they will lose the legitimacy of the disputants, and eventually destroy the
effectiveness of the adjudications.
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Table 1
Summary of Individuals Involved in Financial Statement Frauds: 1998 & 1999
72 Frauds Disclosed in AAERs during the period

Number of frauds

Percentage of frauds

CEO, President or equivalent

51

70.8%

Other senior management

14

19.4%

7

9.8%

72

100%

Division management
Total
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